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T HE doctrine of accession is unusual in that it permits a tres-
passer to acquire title to converted property on which he has
done work or added materials. It originated in the civil law, and
was incorporated into the common law at an early date. As early
as the Yearbook 5 Hen. 7, f. 15, p1 .6 (1490), it was stated that
one who made malt from grain belonging to another became the
owner of the new species.' The policy behind the doctrine is to
prevent imposition of an excessive penalty on a wrongdoer in cer-
tain situations.
As a general proposition title to property remains in the orig-
inal owner regardless of an improvement by a wrongdoer.2 The
maxim that one cannot be deprived of property except by his own
voluntary act or by operation of law is fundamental; only when
the property no longer exists in its original state or when it becomes
an integral part of another thing, will title pass by accession.3
The principle of accession is applied to both real and personal
property. Accession in real property occurs when a chattel is
attached to land and becomes a fixture. This discussion will be lim.
ited to the application of the doctrine in the field of personal
property.
A chattel may be improved through the use of skill and labor
or by incorporation with other materials. When the improvement
is accomplished by the latter method, title to the annexed article
may pass by adjunction." If the species of the article has been
changed, title may pass to the improver by specification.'
There is considerable disagreement as to what constitutes a
change in species. In a general way a change is accomplished
12 KENT. COMM. 361; see translation of Y. B. 5 Hen. 7, f. 15, pl. 6 (1490), in note
to Silsbury v. McCoon, 4 Denio (New York) 332, 335 (1847).
2 Silsbury v. McCoon, 3 N. Y. 379, 53 Am. Dec. 307 (1850).
8 Baker v. Mersch, 29 Neb. 227, 45 N. W. 685 (1890) ; Merritt v. Johnson, 7 Johns.(N. Y.) 473, 5 Am. Dec. 289 (1811).
4 Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 559, 33 Am. Dec. 764 (1839).
5 Reader v. Moody, 48 N. C. 372 (1856) ; see Arnold, The Law of Accession of Per-
sonal Property, 22 Col. L. Rev. 103 (1922).
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where the improvement results in an article which falls into a class
different from that of the original article. Statements in some
cases would indicate that the relative value of the manufactured
product and the original material is more decisive.'
In the civil law there was much discussion as to the extent of the
change required to pass title from the original owner to the person
making the improvement.7 Justinian states that if the improved
article can be reduced to its former materials, the owner of the
materials should be the owner of the product; but if the product
cannot be so reduced, title should pass to the improver. The early
English cases permitted the owner of materials to seize and keep
the new article if he could prove the identity of his original mate-
rials. Both of these tests have found their way into the American
cases.
Many cases which have arisen in this country purport to follow
the "physical identity" approach! It is difficult to determine
exactly what this means in each case. It is possible to consider
that no change in species is effected so long as the new article
contains essentially the same substance as the original material.
The inadequacy of this test becomes apparent when one considers
the instances of cloth made into a coat, or grain made into malt.
In the former example title to the coat is thought to remain in the
owner of the material, while in the latter, title to the malt passes
to the maker.
Statements in some cases indicate that a change in species is
considered effected whenever the original material cannot be
identified in the new article by use of the five senses. When grain
is made into malt or iron into a tool, the original material cannot
be identified. By accession, title to the product should be in the
improver, but it is stated that the converter of grain will acquire
6 Weatherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 7 Am. Rep. 653 (1871) ; Louis Werner Stave
Co. v. Pickering, 119 S. W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
7 2 KENT. COMM. 363.
8 Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N. C. 85, 20 S. E. 188 (1894) ; Lampton's Executors v. Pres-
ton's Executors, 1 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 454, 19 Am. Dec. 104 (1829) ; see Betts v. Lee, 5
Jehns. (N. Y.) 348, 4 Am. Dec. 368 (1810).
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title to the malt while the converter of the iron is not entitled to
the tool.'
The relative value test avoids the more difficult, arbitrary dis-
tinctions, and attempts to establish substantial equity. Texas has
followed the relative value approach since the turn of the century.
In Texas and New Orleans Railway Company v. Jones' Executors"0
the innocent trespasser was permitted to retain railway ties which
had been made from timber cut on another's land. The ties had
a value of 350 each; it was agreed that the value of the timber
used in making a tie was 6¢. This represents a relative value ratio
of 6:1. In an earlier case1 the owner of timber had been permit-
ted to recover the value of the finished ties. This was distinguished
in Texas and New Orleans Railway Co. v. Jones' Executors on the
ground that the trespasser in the earlier case had acted in bad
faith, while in the instant case the improver had acted innocently.
In another case 2 it was held that title to staves, which were made
from timber belonging to another, passed to the innocent tres-
passer. The staves were worth $1,080; the timber used had a value
of $339. This would indicate that a threefold increase in value is
sufficient to pass title.
In other jurisdictions the cases have held that a greater increase
in value is necessary before title will pass to innocent improvers."
An Arkansas decision refused to permit an innocent trespasser to
keep ties which he had made from timber belonging to another
where the ratio of values was 6:1." In Louisiana, however, it is
indicated that the rule is flexible and more favorable to the tres-
passer."
9See Y. B. 5 Hen. 7, f. 15, pl. 6 (1490), and Moore's Report 20, 72 Eng. Rep. R.
411 (1560).
10 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77 S. W. 955 (1903).
11 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Starr, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 55 S. W.
393 (1899) er. ref.
12 Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering, 119 S. W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
is The Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 26 Am. Rep. 520 (1877).
14 Eaton v. Langley, 65 Ark. 448, 47 S. W. 123 (1898).




Under Texas law it would appear that a willful trespasser can
never acquire title to improved goods solely on the basis of an
increase in value. In Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co.'
a portion of the opinion in Louis Werner Stave Co. v. Pickering17 is
quoted with approval:
"The general rule is that the owner of property has the right to all
that becomes united or attached to it by accession; but when such
accession is produced by labor of another, and the identity of the prop-
erty is thereby changed and its value greatly increased, the right to the
property in its changed condition depends upon whether the person
converting it acts in good faith believing that the property was his at
the time of the conversion. If taken under these circumstances, the title
to the property in its changed condition passes by accession to the per-
son by whose labor its value has been so increased, and the original
owner can only recover the value of the property in its condition at the
time of the taking. On the other hand, a willful trespasser can acquire
no right in property, it matters not how much he may increase its value,
for the law will not permit one to take advantage of his own wrong."
If this broad statement is followed, it appears that in Texas, no
matter how great the change in identity, the willful trespasser
would never get title. A textwriter has indicated that where the
change was great enough, willful improvers might acquire title
to the new product."
Whenever the original owner is entitled to the improved article,
he may elect to recover the article or damages. The proper measure
of damages in the case of a willful trespasser is the enhanced value.
If the trespasser was innocent, only the original value is recov-
ered. But if the improver is entitled to the new species, the orig-
inal owner's remedy is recovery of the value of the converted
property before improvement'" It is likely that Texas would fol-
18125 Tex. 284, 301, 83 S. W. 2d 638, 648 (1935).
17 119 S. W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
18 See BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) 48.
19 Kirby Lumber Co. v. Temple Lumber Co., 125 Tex. 284, 83 S. W. 2d 638 (1935);




low the rule of most jurisdictions permitting an innocent purchaser
who has improved an article sufficiently to retain it even though it
was purchased from a willful trespasser. One case"0 indicates a
bona fide purchaser from a bona fide accessioner would be liable
only for the value of the original article. In Texas the fides of the
party making the improvement assumes great importance.
It has been held that a willful trespasser can acquire title by
accession where the owner with knowledge acquiesces in the im-
provement." This would not be true under the broad statement in
the Kirby Lumber case.
When the goods of two different owners are joined together in
such a way that they cannot be separated without material injury,
the owner of the principal part gets title." This is accession by
adjunction. It operates regardless of the mala fides of the con-
verter. The policy of the rule rests upon the desire to maintain
property in its most useful state. When the article can be separated
without impairing the usefulness of the principal good, there is no
necessity for passing title to the owner of the principal part. This
phase of the doctrine is often involved when accessories or tires
are sold under seller's lien and placed on a mortgaged vehicle.
Most jurisdictions have permitted the seller to recover the tires or
accessories upon default and when the mortgage on the vehicle was
foreclosed where title to the additions was reserved by the seller."
Both Arkansas and Oklahoma would permit conditional sellers
to recover severable accessories and parts when title has been
reserved.24 In jurisdictions where the lien theory of mortgages is
followed, sellers of severable additions have been allowed to retake
20 Texas & New Orleans Railway Co. v. Jones' Executors, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 94, 77
S. W. 955 (1903).
21 See Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570 (1872).
22 Pulcifer v. Page, 32 Me. 404, 54 Am. Dec. 582 (1851) ; Merritt v. Johnson, 7
Johns. (N. Y.) 473, 5 Am. Dec. 289 (1811) ; Ochoa v. Rogers, 234 S. W. 693 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921) er. dism'd.
23 Blackwood Tire & Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 Tenn. 515, 182 S. W.
576 (1916) ; see 15 Tex. L. Rev. 140 (1936).
24 Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 181 Ark. 127, 24 S. W. 2d 974, 68 A. L. R. 1239 (1930);
K. C. Tire Co. v. Way Motor Co. 143 Okla. 87, 287 Pac. 993 (1930).
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them where a security interest had been reserved.2" There are a
few cases which have put emphasis upon the after-acquired pro-
visions of the mortgage contract in holding that the accessories
passed with the vehicle at foreclosure." The after-acquired clause
should be effective between the parties to the contract, but it should
not affect the innocent seller's right to the addition at default.
Texas in this instance has followed the preferred application of
the rule of accession. In Firestone Service Stores v. Darden27 an
unpaid vendor sold tires to a purchaser who placed them on his
mortgaged automobile. Upon foreclosure of the mortgage on the
automobile, the vendor was permitted to recover the tires. The
court reasoned that the seller had retained his security interest and
the parts in question could be severed from the vehicle without
injury. It has been held that after-acquired provisions of the mort-
gage are not controlling in determining if accessories have become
part of the vehicle by accession.2" The severability of the access-
ories assumes great importance if title or security interest is
reserved by the seller. The result seems proper because the owner
of the mortgage on the automobile still has the security he initially
obtained. If a part has been removed, he has an action for impair-
ment of his security.
A recent case2" of interest involved a situation in which the
article had a greater value in its constituent parts than as a unit.
A combination spudder and drilling rig was sold to a purchaser,
who had knowledge that the machinery was subject to a chattel
mortgage. The purchaser separated the machine into two drilling
rigs. The value was increased, and the purchaser claimed the two
new machines free of the mortgage by accession. It was held that
the mortgage was effective between the parties and as against pur-
chasers with notice regardless of how much the article might be
25 Lincoln Road Equipment Co. v. Bolton, 127 Neb. 224, 254 N. W. 884 (1934).
26 Twin City Motor Co. v. Rouzer Motor Co., 197 N. C. 371, 148 S. E. 461 (1929).
27 96 S. W. 2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
28 Star Finance Corp. v. Chain Investment Co., 146 S. W. 2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940).
29 Hodges v. Leach, 214 S. W. 2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
1951]
